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THE INEVITABLE TREND TOWARD UNIVERSALLY
RECOGNIZABLE SIGNALS OF PROPERTY CLAIMS:
AN ESSAY FOR CAROL ROSE
Robert C. Ellickson*

It was love at first sight. The first time Carol Rose encountered the field of
property she fell madly in love with it.1 By her own report, this happened when she
was a first-year student at the University of Chicago Law School.2 What attracted her
immediately was “property law’s impact on the visible world,”3 in particular, on the
complex cityscapes of Chicago itself.4 And, during her career she would come to love
the variety and flexibility of property institutions and how they could be molded to
promote a wide array of human values.
I too was immediately enamored when I took my first property course in law
school. As Carol has written, she and I have remarkably similar backgrounds.5 We
both spent our childhoods in or near Washington, D.C., where our fathers held federal
jobs that entailed work with statistics on national social and economic conditions. Perhaps our fathers’ fascination with knowing how life is lived on the ground rubbed off
on us. Repelled by the social rigidities that then characterized most eastern colleges,
Carol and I both chose to attend a co-educational college in a small town in Ohio. At
the last available moment, Carol switched her choice from Oberlin, my eventual alma
mater, to the even edgier Antioch.6 Perhaps our years in these close-knit college towns
helped to create, or strengthen, the communitarian inclinations that would surface in
our scholarship. Of course, Carol and I also differ in many ways. Although we both
were active in team sports as youths and remain movie buffs, our adult recreational
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. Prepared
for the Seventh Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, William & Mary Law
School, October 1, 2010.
1
With apologies to JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 1 (1961). Heller’s novel appeared when
Carol was a junior at Antioch. It was an immediate must-read on every campus.
2
Carol M. Rose, Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3–4 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Property and Language]
(stressing the influence of Professor Allison Dunham’s tales about the origins of Grant Park
on Chicago’s lakefront).
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id.
5
Carol M. Rose, Of Natural Threads and Legal Hoops: Bob Ellickson’s Property
Scholarship, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 199 (2009). I recall first meeting Carol in
Allison Dunham’s office in 1975, near the end of my stint as a visiting professor at the
University of Chicago Law School.
6
Id.
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interests rarely overlap. I am as bewildered by her interest in dance and playing the
recorder as she is by my interest in tournament Scrabble.
Carol’s enthusiasm for both the subject of property, and the varied institutions of
property, was evident during 1989–2005, her long—for her, uncharacteristically long—
stint on the faculty of the Yale Law School. Especially prior to Henry Smith’s arrival
in 2001, during that period Carol and I bore most of the load of property instruction
at Yale. Yale is perhaps the only law school in the United States that does not require
a student to take a Property course.7 During Carol’s time at Yale, however, about
ninety percent of Yale J.D. students did elect to enroll before graduating. This was the
highest percentage for any non-required course, with Business Associations a close
runner-up. Carol and I privately both took some pride in this fact.8 Needless to say,
Carol’s infectious love of the institutions and puzzles of property helped to draw in
Yale students.
I. CAROL ROSE THE PERSON
A few years back, at a public event honoring Carol, I stated that at times she
brought to mind a member of the comedy team Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis, and that
I wasn’t thinking of Dean Martin. Our mutual colleague Bill Eskridge immediately
suggested that, among the comedic giants of the 1950s, an even better choice would
be Lucille Ball. I now accept Bill’s friendly amendment.
The smashing success of the television show “I Love Lucy” lay in the appeal of
the title character. Lucy had a quick wit, a ready laugh, lacked pretension, and never
fell into funks of self-absorption. Just like Carol. And these traits endear. According
to Stephen Yandle, when Northwestern University’s new law building was about to
come on line in the 1980s, he separately asked each Northwestern faculty to name
a few colleagues whose office they would prefer to be located nearby.9 Across this
broad and diverse faculty, Carol’s name was by far the name most often mentioned.
She is as loved as Lucy was.
Carol is an irrepressible explorer, not only of new environs, but, as we shall later
see, also of disparate scholarly perspectives. During her adulthood, she has lived for an
extended period in an extraordinary variety of regions of the United States. A native
of Falls Church, Virginia, she has had stays of at least a year in two or more cities in
the South (Atlanta, Austin); in the Midwest (Chicago, Columbus); in the East (Ithaca,
7

See Requirements, YALE LAW SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/jdrequirements
.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). For a survey of law schools’ practices, see Peter Wendel
& Robert Popovich, The State of the Property Course: A Statistical Analysis, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 216 (2006).
8
Perhaps too much pride. Property had been one of the most popular courses at Yale
long before Carol and I arrived.
9
Yandle was a key administrative dean at Northwestern Law School until 1985, when
he took on similar responsibilities at Yale, where he later recounted this tale to me.
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New Haven, New York City); and in California (Berkeley, Palo Alto). And when
Carol retired from the Yale Law School at a relatively youthful age, she set up a complicated annual itinerary that had her cycling through two regions that were fresh for
her: the Pacific Northwest (Portland) and the Southwest (Tucson). It is striking that her
professional wanderings have rarely taken her, for a long stay, beyond the boundaries
of the United States.10 This may reflect the difficulty of mastering the property law
of another nation, and perhaps, on Carol’s part, an implicit loyalty to, and affection
for, her native land.
As Carol was winding down her career as a historian, she published in The
American Historical Review a review of a book on the middle-class German women’s
movement during the mid-nineteenth century.11 The review refers to the “general
meekness” of this movement, to its lack of “an essential element of sheer nerve.”12
The colloquial meaning of nerve, which carries negative connotations, is impudent
boldness. In this passage, however, Carol is using nerve to denote a positive attribute,
namely courage.13
And courage has always been one of Carol’s signature traits. Her wanderlust is
one manifestation of it. Another is her willingness to make career moves that statusseekers—that is, most of the rest of us—would reject out of hand.14 As a teenager,
she made the gutsy choice of Antioch. She threw over her tenure-track position at
Ohio State in order to go to law school. And, during her distinguished career as a
legal scholar, in three instances she has resigned a professorship at a “higher-ranked”
law school (at least by conventional metrics) in order to assume a professorship at a
“lower-ranked” one.15
It also took courage, more than members of younger generations might imagine,
for a woman to become a law professor when Carol first chose to go down that path.
10

For the record, Carol has also had brief stints as a visiting scholar in Adelaide, Australia,
and Cologne, Germany.
11
Carol M. Rose, Book Review, 79 AM. HIST. REV. 174 (1974) (reviewing MARGRIT
TWELLMANN, DIE DEUTCSHE FRAUENBEWEGUNG IM SPIEGEL REPRÄSENTATIVER FRAUENZEITSCHRIFTEN: IHRE ANFÄNGE UND ERSTE ENTWICKLUNG, 1843–1889 (1972)).
12
Id. at 175.
13
See id.
14
Interestingly, there is a reference to status in the title of Carol’s history dissertation, Carol
Rose Loss, Status in Statu: The Concept of Estate in the Organization of German Political Life,
1750–1825 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Uris Library,
Cornell University). Carol would get a better hang at choosing titles as her scholarly career
progressed. Starting a title with a Latin phrase that almost no one can fathom is unlikely to
attract a general readership.
15
According to one observer, the turmoil surrounding tenure processes at the University
of California Berkeley Law School during Carol’s stint there may have played a role in her
decision to decamp to Northwestern. See Herma Hill Kay, UC’s Women Law Faculty, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 331, 393 (2003). Knowing Carol’s courage, I’d say that it’s more likely that she
would have be put off by the unpleasantness of the atmosphere within the school than by any
risks that the tenure process might pose to her.
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She began teaching law in 1978 at Stanford. By that date, the number of female law
students nationwide had burgeoned,16 but there were as yet few female professors.17
During most of Carol’s student days at the University of Chicago Law School, no
member of that school’s tenure-track faculty was a woman.18 When Carol joined the
Stanford Law faculty, Barbara Babcock was the only other female faculty member.
Female role models and mentors plainly were scarce. During that era, many law students—especially female students, according to women law professors of the time—
were hypercritical of female professors, judging them by a higher standard. Carol’s
“nerve” no doubt helped her during that era.
II. CAROL ROSE THE SCHOLAR
Unlike many property teachers, Carol has a generally sunny view of the property
institutions that have evolved in the United States. Although hardly Pollyannaish,
Carol, like Elinor Ostrom,19 one of her sources of inspiration, has confidence that
people in a local community such as Yellow Springs, Ohio, are likely to be pretty
good—there’s a Roseian phrase—at working out institutional arrangements to govern
resources. Many other property scholars, by contrast, are gripers. Staunch advocates
of strong private property rights—a small minority within the legal academy—tend
to view the legal trends of the past century as the start of a possibly irreversible journey
down the road to statism.20 Leftish critics of current property arrangements—a far more
numerous group within the academy21—commonly regard property institutions, and
indeed the rhetoric of property, as baneful forces that foster self-interested behavior and
impede progress toward greater distributive justice.22
16

The percentage of students at ABA-approved law schools who were women increased
from 5.9% in 1968 to 30.3% in 1978. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 53 (1993).
17
In 1978, 9.5% of tenure-track law school professors were women, up from 1.9% in
1968. Id. at 219.
18
One year after Carol arrived at Chicago in 1973, Soia Mentschikoff, the school’s only
female faculty member, left to become dean of the University of Miami School of Law.
19
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
691, 702 & n.56 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Privatization] (citing ELINOR OSRTOM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–65 (1990)).
20
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980).
21
Cf. John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions
by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L. J. 1167, 1205 (2005) (reporting that about eighty percent of political contributions of law professors at highly-ranked law schools go to Democratic
candidates).
22
See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990); William H.
Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991); Joseph William Singer,
After the Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243 (2006).
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These sorts of negativism dismay Carol. Consider this passage, which Carol
wrote in a response to an article written by Milton Regan:
A number of property scholars (and I count myself among them)
have been arguing for years that . . . responsibility, cooperation,
and attentiveness to others [ ] are essential features of any property regime. Why is this so? The reason is that property is very
largely a creature of culture, and property’s complex cultural outcroppings depend on the recognition and acquiescence of entire
communities of people. That is why it is so dispiriting to see that
Professor Regan’s article largely dismisses these more cooperative
aspects of property, and instead dwells on the most conventional
caricatures of property rhetoric . . . exclusivity, boundedness, and
me-first-ism.23
The most-cited of Carol’s many landmark articles is the joyously titled The
Comedy of the Commons.24 There she describes how members of local communities
succeed in diffuse fashion in creating roads, recreation areas, and other sites for collective activity,25 and how Anglo-American law for centuries has tended to honor claims
of customary collective rights.26 Among her many examples is one of her favorite judicial decisions: an English case upholding customary community rights to hold maypole dances on the freehold of a landowner who wanted to terminate the practice.27
Carol is a committed localist who revels in the potential diversity of community
life. Given the predominant centralizing sentiment within the American legal academy,
every faculty should include a passel of Carols. Students at U.S. law schools are awash
in courses featuring federal law—e.g., the federal constitution, the federal rules of civil
procedure, federal administrative law, federal tax law, and on and on. Many distinguished law journals, such as the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, largely
devote themselves to national (and even international) law. Carol is fully aware of
the value of larger governments. She has explored, for example, the meaning of the
federal Takings Clause28 and policy options for addressing global warming.29
23

Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82
GEO. L.J. 2409, 2410 (1994) (citations omitted); see also Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject
of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2007).
24
See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy].
25
Id. at 722.
26
Id. at 713–14, 720–22.
27
Id. at 741 n.143, 758 n.231, 767 nn.274–75 (citing Hull v. Nottinghan, 33 L.T.R. 697
(Ex. D. 1876)).
28
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings
Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681 (2007).
29
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, From H2O To CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon
Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91 (2008).
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But Carol’s heart lies more with local government and informally organized local
communities. In her scholarship, she has repeatedly criticized James Madison’s assertions in Federalist No. 10 that factions tend to dominate at the local level.30 In Carol’s
view, the members of a minority faction in a locality can resort to the tools of voice
and exit (or the threat of exit) to keep a potentially abusive majority faction in check.31
Better yet, community members may be able to resolve many of their conflicts and produce many useful public goods without much guidance from local officials.32 Consider,
if you will, how maypole dances are likely to be organized.
Carol’s high regard for the capacities of members of informal communities is
evident in her classic articles on the proper handling of piecemeal zoning changes.33
As always, she articulates the issue in earthy fashion: should a city authorize the owner
of a corner lot “to tear down the Victorian house and build a gas station.”34 Although
some legal scholars might see this sort of issue as small beer, the amount of litigation
over these sorts of issues indicates that the lot owner and neighbors commonly do
not. “Plan jurisprudence,” Carol’s phrase for the prior legal wisdom on this question,
would require judges on a reviewing state court to determine whether a zoning decision to allow, or not allow, the gas station was consistent with the principles set out
in the local government’s official plan.35 When a piecemeal change is at issue, this
legal approach is far too centralized for Carol. She does want to assure that the local
zoning officials are conscientious mediators, and that they provide both the developer
and affected neighbors with adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. But in contexts where those conditions have been satisfied, Carol is happy to defer to whatever
substantive outcome might emerge from give-and-take among the neighbors.36 The
would-be developer and the affected neighbors, after all, have the best information
30

See, e.g., Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, supra note
28, at 1686–88.
31
See id. at 1687 (identifying herself as a “steady critic” of Madison’s analysis); id. at 1687
n.24 (citing three of her own prior works extolling the potential of local governance); see also
id. at 1686–88 (identifying some virtues of local governments, but also shortcomings such
as “chumminess and lack of technical capacity”); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms,
105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131–39 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:
LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS (1995) and assessing the tradition of “localism bashing”).
32
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 891 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and Dealing]
(providing examples of community mediation).
33
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1155 (1985); Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 32.
34
Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, supra note 33, 36, at 1170.
35
See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 32, at 851–53, 861–62 (discussing two
longstanding pillars of the “plan jurisprudence” approach, Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) and Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,”
68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955)).
36
See, Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, supra note 33; Rose,
Planning and Dealing, supra note 32.
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and the most at stake. Carol, ever the localist, is inclined to let them to hash out their
own compromise.37
Carol also is notable for her spectacular intellectual range, another manifestation
of her wanderlust. She majored in philosophy in college, went on to earn a master’s
degree in political science, and then a doctorate in European social and constitutional
history. After a few years of teaching in the history department at Ohio State, she was
off to law school. In her writings, Carol makes use of, and shows a high respect for,
scholarship—at least jargon-free and down-to-earth scholarship—in a highly diverse
range of disciplines.38 For many years, Carol has delivered a lecture to the assembled
class of beginning first-year Yale law students. She has chosen as the title of this lecture, “Introduction to Law & Economics: The Dismal Science Explained for Poets,
Dreamers and the Clueless.” She is perfectly suited to this endeavor because she
deeply admires both poets and those who engage in law-and-economics.39 Another
example: To explore feminist issues, she has repeatedly turned to game theory,40 a rare
move in that genre. On her vita she proudly proclaims her memberships in both the
American Law and Economics Association and the American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy.41 The yin of the humanities and the yang of the harder social
sciences are, within Carol, nicely in balance.
Carol is as approachable in print as she is in person. She is drawn to earthy
examples, such as a maypole dance.42 She refrains from offering special definitions
of terms and otherwise developing her own argot. And, although she happily seeks
help from many disciplines, she is an equal opportunity critic of jargon. In her review
of a book by Mark Sagoff, there is a passage, and an accompanying footnote, that
are pure Carol:
Yeah, yeah, maybe the economics crowd does tout itself as predictive scientists, but it doesn’t sound very civil and open-minded
to say they are just making ‘category mistakes’ either—in fact,

37

Although Carol’s writings include no mention of the principle of subsidiarity, which
favors the decentralization of governance responsibilities to the smallest unit capable of handling them, she appears to share my own enthusiasm for this structural principle.
38
An exception is sociobiology, which typically draws a disdainful remark. See Carol M.
Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 3; Carol M. Rose, Lecture, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 542
(1995).
39
See Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 7–8 (arguing that humanities
scholars have much to learn from law-and-economics scholars, and vice versa).
40
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 37 (1990).
41
Carol Marguerite Rose, Curriculum Vitae, YALE LAW SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/
faculty/rosecurriculumvitae.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
42
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the very phrase sounds like the kind of Intimidator Ray Gun that
philosophers whip out to shut up everybody else.
....
Not that economists are easy to shut up—they’ve got some ray
guns of their own, like “cross-elasticity.” What could be more
of a silencer than that?—maybe the lit-crit crowd’s phronesis, or
trope, or aporia.43
The reference to the lit-crit crowd is particularly telling. As I am about to stress,
Carol has identified her deepest interest to be the communication of claims to property.
Although she is fully aware that many postmodernists share this fascination with communication, in her many writings on the signaling of property claims, she never invokes semiotics, the postmodernist term for the analysis of signs. And hermeneutics,
the postmodern word for the study of texts, appears in an article that Carol published
early in her career,44 but never thereafter.
III. CAROL’S CENTRAL PROJECT: HOW PROPERTY CLAIMANTS TRUMPET
OWNERSHIP TO PASSERSBY
In 2006, on the occasion of Carol’s retirement from full-time teaching at Yale, a
committee of her colleagues organized a conference at which four panels of commentators celebrated her work. The committee originally had envisioned a fifth panel devoted to “Property and Language.” In her contribution to the volume memorializing
the conference, Carol lamented the demise of this “ghost fifth panel”:
The exploration of property and language is actually what I have
often thought to be my central project as a legal scholar. The title
of my book, Property and Persuasion, even refers to that project.
But alas, I have never managed to convince many people how
important it is to think of property in connection with language in
th[e] larger sense of communication—speech, stories, visual clues,
expressions generally.45
I’m convinced, and devote the balance of this essay to her self-confessed passion.
43

Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic
Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1640
& n.25 (1989) [hereinafter Rose, Environmental Faust] (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988)).
44
See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 82–83
(1985) [hereinafter Rose, Possession].
45
Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 2 (citation omitted).
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In the influential article that was her first foray into the topic, Carol provides a
typically matter-of-fact example of an act designed to communicate a property claim:
In my home town of Chicago, one may choose to shovel the snow
from a parking place on the street, but in order to establish a claim
to it one must put a chair or some other object in the cleared space.
The useful act of shoveling snow does not speak as unambiguously
as the presence of an object that blocks entry.46
This brilliant example triggered a small burst of academic writing on methods of claiming shoveled parking spaces.47 Soon I was regularly invoking the problem during the
first week of my property course.
Carol’s example nicely poses the central question of how a person signals a claim
of private ownership of a tangible resource that, in the absence of that signal, others
might regard as unowned (res nullius, at the Romans would put it). John Locke, in
his famous discussion of the origins of property rights, argues that a claimant acquires
property by mixing labor with it.48 A person thus acquires the water running in a
public fountain by confining it in a pitcher, or a wild animal, by slaying it.49 Locke’s
central concern was the normative legitimacy of a claim of private property,50 for example, whether Chicagoans should honor a shoveler’s claim to a parking space. Carol,
by contrast, has been more interested in the factual question of how property claims are
expressed, for example, how Chicago shovelers choose to communicate to passersby.51 These two questions of course are interconnected because a would-be owner
can strengthen the legitimacy of a claim by communicating the claim through proper
means. The title that Carol chose for one of her books, Property and Persuasion, refers
to this interdependence.52
Some social observers are “lumpers” who stress similarities among human cultures.
Others are “splitters” who stress differences among societies. Like many scholars who
have been strongly influenced by economics, I myself am inclined to look for universals.53 Carol, perhaps partly on account of her training in history and her greater
46

Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 81 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 528–33 (2002).
48
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–90 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 94–95, 287–88.
51
Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 81–85.
52
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994) [hereinafter ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION].
53
But cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (urging lawand-economics scholars to be alert to cultural variations).
47
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immersion in literary theory, tends to be more of a splitter. In her scholarship, Carol
frequently invokes the postmodernist axiom that the meaning of a sign depends on the
conventions of an “interpretative community.”54 And these she thinks exist in profusion: “[T]he audience has to ‘get it.’ This . . . is a very freighted matter, because
some audiences do not get it, given that there are quite a variety of cultural ‘worlds’
in the larger world.”55
To illustrate this point, in a number of works she asserts that English colonists
commonly were unable to recognize the signs that indigenous peoples were using to
communicate land claims.56 This viewpoint is consistent with her passion for localism, referred to above. I soon raise the possibility, however, that, when claims to tangible property are being communicated, interpretative communities are in fact not all
that diverse.
When writing about property claiming, Carol frequently refers to the “language”
and “rhetoric” that claimants employ. The subtitle of Property and Persuasion, for
example, is Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership.57 A superficial
reader thus might suppose that she thinks that a claimant of property typically uses
words to communicate with passersby. Not so. For Carol, language denotes far more
than verbal forms. For the cover of Property and Persuasion, for example, she chose
a photograph of a ramshackle gate in a sagging barbed-wire fence protecting a hardscrabble ranch in the American West.58 No words appear in the picture. Carol starts
the book with this passage:
Picture property. Use your mind’s eye: what do you see? Perhaps
a bank vault full of money or a house or maybe a fence—all common images in musings about property. . . . [T]he dilapidated
object in the picture [on the book cover] does not look like much
of a fence, but it certainly does assert something about property.
It says pretty clearly, “This is mine.”59
A gate communicates. It “says” things.60 Carol thus stresses that a property
claimant commonly uses a nonverbal visual cue, such as a fence or a chair placed in
a shoveled parking space, to assert a property claim.
54

See, e.g., Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 84.
Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 6; see also Rose, Possession, supra
note 44, at 84–85.
56
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
57
ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note 52.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1.
60
See also Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 2 (referencing “speech, stories,
visual clues, expressions generally”); id. at 12 (describing acts that signal ownership, such as
a hunter’s killing of a fox, as “‘texts’ of property”).
55

2011]

UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZABLE SIGNALS OF PROPERTY CLAIMS

1025

IV. SOME (OVERLY ECONOMISTIC?) THOUGHTS ON THE COMMUNICATION OF
PROPERTY CLAIMS
To add a bit of spice to this festschrift, I now try to build on Carol’s fundamental
insights into the nature of property claiming. My thoughts are somewhat less humanistic than hers because I am less inclined to soften economics with poetry. And, being
more of a lumper, I question whether the relevant interpretive communities are quite
so diverse. Indeed, my central thesis in this section is that humans have been developing, over the past several millennia, a universal sign language (i.e., a set of nonverbal
visual cues) for asserting claims to tangible property. Increasing urbanization and
international travel have both fueled this trend.
To assess the intuitive plausibility of these assertions, imagine that you have just
arrived in a large city in a land completely foreign to you. Consider, for example, a
contemporary voyage to Antananarivo (the capital of Madagascar), or a voyage 3,700
years ago to Hammurabi’s Babylon. Even in such unfamiliar surroundings, I hypothesize that you would be able to readily understand the actions that the residents of these
cities had taken to communicate to a passerby such as yourself their claims to private
ownership of land and other tangible assets. This is an empirical claim, and potentially
refutable through actual travel to exotic settings.61 Here is the reasoning behind it.
A. A Property Claimant as a Rational Actor: The Costs and Benefits of Signs
Law-and-economics scholars start from the premise that an individual acts
rationally and self-interestedly. During the past generation, advances in the field of
behavioral economics have forced some tweaking of this basic model, but hardly its
abandonment.62 As a first approximation, a Chicago resident who wants to signal
ownership of a shoveled-out parking space can be expected to weigh the costs and
benefits of alternative methods of signaling, and to choose the method that promises
61

Investigators unsurprisingly have found that the people in different societies, in some
contexts, do behave differently. See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus:
Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001).
62
Carol herself has noted that the traditional rational-actor model exaggerates the selfishness
of actors. See Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 8; see also Rose, Environmental
Faust, supra note 43, at 1642–43. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (stressing limits on individuals’ selfinterest, cognitive capacity, and self-control). Behavioral economics potentially may enrich
analysis of property signaling. The act of communicating a signal of ownership perhaps might
itself increase the claimant’s subjective valuation of the resource being claimed. In some classic
experiments on endowment effects, the experimenter distributes a coffee mug to selected
students in her class. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195–97 (1991). If a student recipient
were to immediately place the mug in his backpack, that act by itself conceivably might
enhance his valuation of it.
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to be personally the most advantageous.63 It is less costly, for example, to use the
placement of a lawn chair, as opposed to a laptop computer, as a signal because there
is a risk that the placed item will be stolen.64 The expected benefits of a given signal
are a function of the number of passersby who can be expected to understand that the
claimant is asserting a claim of proprietorship and also their recognition of the intensity
of that claim. Placing a copy of yesterday’s Chicago Tribune in a shoveled space is
even less costly than placing a lawn chair there, but that act also would be far less beneficial. A stale newspaper is: a more ambiguous signal than a lawn chair because a passerby is more likely to regard it as an abandoned object; a less emphatic signal because
it doesn’t block entry (a point Carol made when she introduced this example);65 and,
because an old newspaper is so valueless, a less intense signal of proprietorship. In a
social setting where there are conventional means of signaling claims to property, by
hewing to those conventions a claimant can obtain advantages on both the cost side and
the benefit side. Copying what others have done requires little thought, and passersby
are more likely to comprehend a conventional signal than an unconventional one.
B. The Key Distinction Between an Ownership Earmark and Title Assurance
Information
As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have repeatedly stressed, a property right
operates in rem.66 It confers on an owner a general right to exclude, which all other
persons in the world, except in rare circumstances, have a duty to honor.67 A passerby who sees a valuable object or land surface may have difficulty determining whether
the observed resource is up for grabs. In some instances, it is. Items of clothing, tools,
and other artifacts become res nullius when abandoned by a prior owner.68 Until captured or domesticated, animals are unowned. In cities, about one-third of the land
area is devoted to open-access streets and parks.69 Because nonprivate property is
63

See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003); see also Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 84 & n.46 (noting
that, all else equal, a claimant of property should prefer to signal a claim in low-cost fashion).
64
Animals may also be alert to the costs and benefits of various means of property claiming.
For a wolf, urination is a much cheaper method of marking territory than, say, trying to build
a cairn. And, because wolves have an unusually acute sense of smell, an act of urination is
a prominent, if time-limited, signal.
65
Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 81.
66
They first introduce this theme in Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
8, 32, 54–55 (2000).
67
Id.
68
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (2010); see
also Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191 (2010).
69
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 15 (3d ed. 2005).
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so prevalent, a person who wishes to claim exclusive ownership of a resource has
reason to affix an ownership earmark on it in order to signal to passersby to keep their
hands and feet off.70 Providing an effective ownership earmark is a challenge, however,
because the peoples of the world speak myriad different languages and increasingly
travel long distances to visit strange lands.
These basic facts underlie the hypothesis that property claimants everywhere increasingly make use of a universal sign language to communicate in rem claims to
passersby. In Antananarivo, Madagascar, for example, a house owner or merchant
showing wares must anticipate that some total strangers will happen by. To prevent
these strangers from wrongly entering the house or wrongly taking the goods, these
property owners are drawn to employing simple signals of proprietorship that foreigners
are likely to comprehend.
An owner also commonly has reason to communicate much more detailed information to members of a much narrower audience, namely those who wish to engage
in a transaction involving a particular asset. An owner of land, for example, may wish
to sell it, lease it, mortgage it, or encumber it with a servitude. A transferee involved
in one of these sorts of transactions commonly will offer the owner better contract
terms if the owner can assure the transferee that third parties who historically have
been associated with the resource have previously relinquished to the owner all their
rights to it. To provide this sort of title assurance information to transferees, a property
claimant typically uses forms of communication that are quite different from the ones
a claimant uses to communicate to casual passersby.71 Title assurance information
is much more particularized than an ownership earmark, the audience for title assurance information is far smaller, and the members of that audience have more time and
greater incentive to engage in careful research. Beginning in ancient Mesopotamia,
states have encouraged the development of recording and registration systems to
facilitate the communication of detailed information about the quality of land titles.72
Unlike an ownership earmark, title assurance information typically is communicated
by means of words, indeed, written words. This may create complications when transacting parties don’t speak the same language, but the parties commonly have both the
time and motivation to seek the assistance of translators.
This distinction between ownership earmarks addressed to the world, and detailed
title assurance information addressed to transferees, is fundamental. My hypothesis
that there is an inevitable trend toward a universal sign language of property claiming
applies only to the former, that is, to patterns of ownership earmarking.73
70

See generally Smith, supra note 63, at 1115–25 (discussing the communication of
property claims, particularly those based on possession).
71
See id. at 1141–44, 1167–73.
72
See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 384–87 (1995).
73
Because the intended audiences are different, the establishment of a recording or registration system does not obviate the need to place physical markers of ownership on the ground.
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C. The Advantages of Permanent Nonverbal Visual Cues as Ownership
Earmarks
A person who places a chair in a shoveled parking space has chosen to alert other
potential claimants through their sense of sight. Why sight, as opposed to one of the
other four human senses?74 Why wouldn’t a claimant spray a cleared parking space
with a cheap perfume, much like a wolf urinates to establish the boundary of a territorial claim? Why not place electronic speakers (hypothetically invisible) in a shoveled
space, and program them to repetitively broadcast an appropriate message, perhaps
Michael Jackson’s megahit Beat It.
As Carol herself has stressed, a visual signal is, in most contexts, the most costeffective method of informing the world of an assertion of ownership.75 An odor or
sound commonly sends a less precise message than a visual earmark does. In the
process of seeking a shoveled parking space, a Chicago motorist who gets a whiff
of a cheap perfume, or hears the sounds of Beat It, might not be able to deduce the
boundaries of the tangible object that the claimant was trying to brand.76 Moreover,
unlike many smells and sounds, a passerby commonly can detect a visual cue at a long
distance. It is likely that a passerby’s hopes of being successful at making a grab rise
as he nears the object in question. By providing a long-distance signal, a claimant
lessens the risks of raising and then dashing the expectations of passersby, and thus
angering them. Partly because a passerby can instantly turn away from a visual cue,
it also is less likely than an olfactory or auditory cue to be regarded as a nuisance.
Most important, the placement of a brand or other physical mark typically endures
far longer than a smell or sound would. Smells dissipate. Electronic speakers are vulnerable to power failure. For the same reason, a visual cue that is ephemeral is less
But see Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their
Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 433 (2008) [hereinafter Rose,
Big Roads].
74
A valuable exploration of the possibilities of addressing communication to the various
five senses is Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and Legal
Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873 (1992), cited in Carol M. Rose,
Privatization, supra note 19, at 703 n.65 (2006).
75
Carol’s last chapter in Property and Persuasion is a stimulating and previously unpublished essay entitled Seeing Property. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note 52,
at 267–304. The chapter’s title underscores her sense of the predominance of visual cues in
property claiming. See also id. at 269–94 (discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses
of a fence or other nonverbal cue designed for detection by eyesight).
76
Members of some species use sounds to claim property. For example, natural selection
has favored the survival of birds capable of using songs to assert a territorial claim. See Owen
D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405,
455 (2005). When rivals can enter a claimed space by air as well as by foot, the placement of
effective visual cues on the three-dimensional boundaries of the space may be impossible or
foolhardy. In such situations, sounds and smells are likely to be better signals.
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likely to be cost-effective than one that is more enduring. For example, after completing the shoveling of a parking space, a shoveler could signal ownership of it by
dancing a jig within the space. But this act would communicate a proprietary claim
only to those who happened to witness the dance or to hear about it from a neighbor
who saw it.77 A placed lawn chair, by contrast, speaks day after day.
Let’s turn to a resource far more momentous than a parking space. How have
people communicated to the world claims of private ownership of parcels of land they
are cultivating? This has been a key issue in human civilization since the invention
of agriculture in the Fertile Crescent ten thousand years ago.78 Acts of cultivation
themselves can incorporate visual signals. For example, a farmer who starts to grow
crops on lands previously collectively accessible to all members of her tribe can sow
seeds in an unnatural pattern such as rows, or through weeding create a monoculture
that looks different from nearby natural patterns of vegetation. Anyone seeing a visual
cue of this sort should know better than to reap where she has not sown.79
A cultivation pattern, however, may provide a visual cue only during the actual
period of cultivation. A claimant who aspires to enduring ownership of a field must
send out a more enduring visual signal. One relatively inexpensive option is to
place, at well-trafficked perimeter points, cairns, wooden posts, or other objects that
are obviously artificial, just as a lawn chair is when seen in a parking space. The
Hebrew Bible is full of injunctions against moving a neighbor’s boundary stones, evidence that methods of this sort were once commonly in use, but also hardly tamperproof.80 Many land claimants therefore turn to more costly options such as erecting
a fence, wall, or moat to signal the boundary of claimed territory. This is hardly news
to Carol, who of course chose to place a photograph of a fence on the cover of Property
and Persuasion.81
In that photographed scene, there might also have been a “no trespassing” sign,
but there isn’t.82 A snow shoveler in Chicago might place a handwritten sign (perhaps,
77

Cf. Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing the highly contested
issue in Australian law of whether Aborigines’ stories, songs, and celebrations about specific
lands that they had never occupied should be regarded as sufficient to support claims to those
lands).
78
See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 72, at 330 n.37 (discussing the rise of agriculture
in the Fertile Crescent).
79
In the United States, a passerby traditionally has been privileged to enter rural private
land to hunt or fish, but not if the land is enclosed or under cultivation. See McKee v. Gratz,
260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
80
See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 72, at 344 & n.121.
81
A noncontractual land claim that fails to provide a visual cue is itself likely to fail.
American law has always been hostile to claims of negative prescriptive easements—for
example, of light, air, or view—because the claimant has made no “visible trace” that the
owner of burdened property could notice. See ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note
52, at 269.
82
On the legal significance of these signs in rural areas, see Mark R. Sigmon, Note,
Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549 (2004).
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“I shoveled this. Stay away.”) in a cleared parking space, but instead places a chair.
Why? In many contexts a nonverbal cue promises to reach a broader audience than
a verbal message would. Especially until the last few centuries, most adults were illiterate.83 A five-year-old who is too young to read can well understand the meaning of
a fence. And, in a city such as Chicago that teems with tourists and recent immigrants,
a passerby literate in some languages may be unable to comprehend a message in
English. When the goal is to communicate to the entire world, a property claimant
therefore commonly prefers to use not words, but a visual marker—such as a fence,
brand, tag, or pictorial image—that will be more widely recognized.
D. The Inevitable Rise of Universal Conventions for Communicating In Rem
Property Claims to Passersby
My hypothesis that there is an inevitable trend toward a universal sign language
of property claiming is in tension with the notion that distinct interpretative communities exist in profusion. Certainly, in a social environment where strangers virtually
never appear, the members of a community may be able to sustain a special system for
signaling property claims. Close-knit whalers, for example, developed visual cues
governing claims of ownership of high-seas whales that would not be transparent to
non-whalers.84 Many of Carol’s own examples of distinctive interpretive communities
are drawn from Stuart Banner’s work on pre-colonial Australia, New Zealand, and
Hawaii.85 Prior to Anglo-American colonization, the natives of each of these islands
were isolated by the waters of the Pacific. These places thus are intuitively plausible
locales for the emergence of a special system of property claiming.
For several reasons, however, the number of distinct interpretative communities has
been fast dwindling.86 The inexorable forces of globalization scatter strangers everywhere. Life in contemporary Madagascar, the most exotic large island that comes
83

For example, in the early seventeenth century literary rates of men in England, France
and Scotland ranged from roughly twenty to somewhat over thirty-three percent. KENNETH A.
LOCKRIDGE, LITERACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
OF LITERACY IN THE EARLY MODERN WEST 45–46 (1974).
84
See Smith, supra note 63, at 1120–22.
85
See, e.g., Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 6 nn.14–15 and accompanying
text (citing Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early
Australia, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 95, 100–04, 107–12 (2005)); see also ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION, supra note 52, at 294–96 (discussing instances of colonists’ blindness to native
land claims in both Hawaii and North America); Rose, Possession, supra note 44, at 85–88
(discussing judicial indifference to Native American land claims).
86
Carol has recently written that “to mark the land physically, for example by cutting
trees, erecting fences, and/or farming or mining. . . . is modernist in the sense that the markers
are intended to be observable by any stranger at all (rather than only by insiders to a community) . . . .” Rose, Big Roads, supra note 73, at 433. If she regards the current world to be
awash in modernism, as she likely does, she may be willing to endorse my general thesis.
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to my mind, hardly resembles life in pre-colonial Australia or Hawaii. The website
TripAdvisor identifies forty-one hotels in Madagascar’s capital, Antananarivo.87
Moreover, some observers might be skeptical of the claim that the interpretative
communities of the various Pacific islanders differed greatly from those of the colonizers. There are at least two ways of explaining, for example, why English colonists
referred to Australia as terra nullius despite the presence of aboriginal people. The
first, supportive of the notion of distinct interpretative communities, is that the English
couldn’t comprehend that Australia’s natives actually claimed ownership interests in
the lands that they had long nomadically occupied.88 The second, arguably more consistent with the evidence, is that the English colonists quickly did come to understand
the reality of aboriginal land claims, but decided that it would be cheaper to expropriate native lands than to negotiate for their purchase.89 By asserting that Australia was
terra nullius, the conquering English could soothe their consciences and perhaps also
mute criticism from outside observers. The historical root of Australian land conflicts
thus may have been greed, not a failure of communication.
Travel and urbanization are the primary forces that erode the usefulness of special
claiming languages and usher in a universal sign language of property. These forces
have long been at work. Ancient Babylon, for example, was a center of international
trade and thus a magnet for strangers.90 Babylonian property owners could see the
advantages of communicating with passersby by means of walls, fences, closed doors,
and other signals that urbanites of the present era could readily comprehend.
Is it plausible that Chicagoans would have developed a unique local language for
the claiming of a shoveled parking space? Probably not. Of course, to resolve the
question, what is ultimately needed is an empirical study of space-claiming practices
in other cold-weather cities, such as Minneapolis, Montreal, and Moscow, to list a few
in the order of their increasing cultural distance from Chicago.
Minor cultural variations in claiming practices of course are to be expected. For
Chicagoans, a lawn chair might be a quintessentially summery object that, when placed
in the snow, is an emphatic signal on account of this incongruity. For Muscovites, a
different object might be quintessentially summery. In a social context where individuals have unusual sensory abilities or disabilities, for example, an institution for
87

TRIPADVISOR, ANTANANARIVO HOTELS, http://www.tripadvisor.com/Hotels-g293809
-Antananarivo-Hotels.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
88
Rose, Property and Language, supra note 2, at 6–7.
89
See Banner, supra note 85, at 103–04, 110–11, 114–23. Compare Banner’s analysis
of Australia with Eric Kades’s analysis of the colonization of the United States. American
colonists could either use force to conquer the indigenous peoples or settle with them by
treaty. Kades asserts that the colonists tended, in a given context, to choose the option that was
cheaper for them. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’intosh and the
Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000).
90
See Russ Versteeg, Early Mesopotamian Commercial Law, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 183,
189–91 (1999).
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the blind, signaling practices can be expected to differ.91 And more cultural variations in claiming practices are to be expected when the tangible resource in question
is physically difficult to earmark, such as a liquid or gas. When an intangible resource,
such as an idea, invention, or artistic performance is at issue, claiming practices are
likely to be highly varied, in part because the normative appropriateness of private
property in these instances is highly contested. But, with these several caveats, I still
hypothesize that there has been an inevitable trend toward a universal sign language
of property claiming.
V. A CONCLUDING TRIBUTE
Although Carol’s career and mine may have been joined at the hip, our frameworks
for analyzing property issues do differ. The yin of the humanities and the yang of economics are more in balance in her. She thus is more inclined to resist cross-cultural
generalizations, and to reject the use of stripped-down models of human motivation.
Intellectual differences of these sorts tend to spark debate and contribute, in the long
run, to the stock of legal knowledge. Or, at least, that’s the self-glorifying premise that
sustains those of us in the academy.
Carol has been a giant in the field of property law both on account of her ideas and
her style. In 1970, three residents of Hyde Park, Ronald Coase, Harold Demsetz, and
George Stigler, had recently published the pioneering works related to the economics
of information.92 When Carol arrived at the University of Chicago Law School a few
years later, these works may have planted, through some indirect means, a seed in her
mind. Carol, when playing the role of economist, has had the prescience to see that
people tend to shape their property institutions with an eye to reducing information
costs. Carol the poet has also known that more than this is going on.
Countless scholars and students have benefitted from her many insights on this
and other subjects. Her unpretentious scholarly style has also served as a role model:
the rejection of jargon, the love of the earthy example, the respect for the competence
of ordinary people who make decisions on the ground.
Let’s overcome our tendency to free-ride and all chip in and buy our friend both
a snow shovel and a lawn chair. Or, better yet, buy her whatever the folks in snowless
Tucson, Carol’s primary new home, employ to signal proprietorship.

91

Because someone who is blind cannot hold a driver’s license, a shoveler who places a
chair in a parking space can be confident that any would-be parker could detect it. By contrast,
in a residential institution for the blind and aged, a resident who wished to assert ownership
of a walking cane would be wise to place on the cane distinctive bumps or indentations that
other residents could feel.
92
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. & ECON. 213 (1961).

A FOXY HEDGEHOG: THE CONSISTENT PERCEPTIONS OF
CAROL ROSE

Jedediah Purdy*

In a tribute like this, the question arises unavoidably: is Carol a fox or a hedgehog?
That is, following Isaiah Berlin’s iconic distinction, does she know many things, like
the fox, or, like the hedgehog, does she know one big thing?1
It may seem strange that the ecosystem of legal scholarship should contain so little
biodiversity; but the question engaged me. I started out thinking that Carol must be a
fox, but I may have thought so for the wrong reasons: reasons of style, basically, having to do with her light-footedness, her deftness, and the recurrent sense that, just when
you thought you had caught her, your trap closes on air and you see a tuft of frizzy hair
disappearing into the trees.
Characteristically, Carol set me straight. When I told her that I found writing this
reflection challenging because each of her pieces is a distinctive meditation, she replied
that she thought I was wrong, that in fact she had just a handful of guiding ideas. Even
allowing for modesty, Carol is nothing if not candid, so I decided that I should at least
have a try at thinking of her as a hedgehog.
Again, the problem may be partly a lack of biodiversity in our metaphors, but I
found myself drawn to this conclusion: Carol is, as she insisted to me, a kind of hedgehog; but she is a very foxy hedgehog.
What I mean by this is, I hope, a little more than the obvious. Carol’s work does
revolve around a consistent set of perceptions. In fact, I would like to say that it revolves around a pair of facts that go together, but tend to unsettle each other, and that
it is the oscillation between these tensely related facts that accounts for her foxiness.
We find Carol’s two signal facts together in her 1989 review of another scholar’s
book on economics and environmental values.2 After disagreeing with the author’s
premises, his conclusions, and the path he takes between them, she credits him with a
pair of important perceptions.3 They may in fact have been his: in any case, I feel clear
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1
See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History,
in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436 (Henry Hardy ed.,
1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
2
See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic
Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (1989)
[hereinafter Rose, Environmental Faust] (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE
EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988)).
3
Id. at 1646.
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that they are Carol’s. First “we live in an imperfect world of limited resources . . . .”4
This, of course, is the practical and irresistible starting point of all economic analysis
of property since Blackstone, if not since Aristotle.5 The second is more unexpected.
Carol says, “we live in a limited rhetorical world, too.”6 This second observation
gave her some appreciation of the other scholar’s argument because, she decided, he
was trying to find a way to get beyond “all this pinched yakking about what’s mine,
and what’s yours, and how much you are going to have to pay me if you want to get
what’s mine.”7
I think the mood of Carol’s work stems from her holding two potentially inconsistent thoughts in mind at once—and, for some very good reasons, being impatient
with anyone who embraces one to the exclusion of the other. The first thought is that
property law is a response to the economic problem: life in a world of scarce and desired resources, among people whose interests often conflict and who have limited,
but real, capacity to make those interests more overlapping by setting up schemes
of cooperation.8 The second is that our imaginative and moral investment in these
“resources” goes well beyond the distinctions that the conventional tools of economic
analysis encompass.9
This can put us in something of a Catch-22. When we discuss our houses, heirlooms, forests, and so forth in the language of economics, we either leave out or distort
some of how we value them, what they mean to us. If, however, we pretend that our
relation to them is not basically shaped by their being scarce and desired resources—
by the economic problem—then we commit an arguably greater distortion.
And so, if there is a single master-idea in Carol’s work, it is a product of the relation between the economic dimension of our lives and the everything-else dimension.
Carol has returned again and again to the theme that the language and forms of property law bridge this divide, and produce forms of partial reconciliation between the
two sides.
4

Id.
See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION 1–5 (2010) (describing the role of this idea in the history of property
thought).
6
Rose, Environmental Faust, supra note 2, at 1646.
7
Id.
8
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Cannons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE
L.J. 601, 631–32 (1998) (“Property regimes always consist of some individual rights, mixed
with some rights shared with nearby associates or neighbors, mixed with still more rights
shared with a larger community, all held in relatively stable but nevertheless changing and
subtly renegotiated relationships.”); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE
L.J. 2175, 2196–97 (1997) (“In situations of competition for scarce resources, property rights
allow disparate parties to find each other, to bargain, to trade, and to leave the bargaining table
with stable entitlements that allow them to plan for their future investments and efforts.”).
9
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 691, 714 (2006) (“Property thus appears to be more available to the imagination than many
other rights . . . .”).
5
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Consider Carol’s discussion of inherently public property in her great piece, The
Comedy of the Commons.10 There she praises commerce as the most expansive and
important commons in modern life, one that trains its members in mutual sympathy,
regard, and forbearance.11 Carol says that commercial life may be as much a community organized by custom as “the community using the village green to dance.”12
With that link, Carol ties recent cases securing beach access for recreation and use
of private property for free speech—interpretations of property rights that secure
“civic” or “community” values—back in an organic line of development to their predecessor doctrines, especially the traditional public trust.13 And at the same time she
reminds us that the public trust began, not as a law of pastoral ancient rights, but as a
way of ensuring that the channels of commerce, often literally waterways, were open
to all and thus able to produce their ever-increasing returns to scale.14 The commercial
commons of the markets that classic property helps create, and the more conventional
commons of civic or community land that all may use just by virtue of their social
membership, are not opposites at all, but complementary ways of producing a rich
set of social benefits, and both are parts of the doctrinal grammar and moral vision of
property.15 This is a vision in which “economic” values and all the “other kinds” of
values are essentially integrated and mutually supportive, and not just as a matter of
social theory, but very much within property thinking.
For a sense of how non-obvious this might be, contrast it with a classic expression
of the thought that property and commerce on the one hand, are opposed to community
and nature on the other. Writing about Enclosure, the creation of private property out
of common land,16 John Clare, the nineteenth-century English poet, wrote of noble oaks
that “to the axe of the spoiler and self-interest fell a prey.”17 He concluded, Enclosure
left “little parcels little minds to please.”18 That’s a very familiar story, whether it
comes from conservative nostalgia, romantic pastoral, or the left-wing tradition of
Karl Marx’s sulfurous portrayal of Enclosure as part of commerce’s modernization
10

Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
11
See id. at 775–77 (discussing the relationship between commerce and sociability).
12
Id. at 776.
13
Id. at 713–14 (beach access); id. at 778 (free speech).
14
Id. at 723.
15
See id. at 717–23 (discussing classic economic theories and public commons).
16
Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition
for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2005) (defining “Enclosure” as “the conversion of common fields and pastures into private land—much of it in the hands of nobility
and other large land-holders—that transformed the English countryside in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.”).
17
JOHN CLARE, Remembrances, in “I AM”: THE SELECTED POETRY OF JOHN CLARE 132,
134 (Jonathan Bate ed., 2003).
18
JOHN CLARE, The Moors, in I AM, supra note 17, at 89, 90.
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process by which “all that is solid melts into air.”19 I think Carol might reply that,
with commerce, all that is solid becomes more complicatedly interdependent.
Carol makes a similar kind of connection in a discussion-by-indirection of the
republican strand in property theory. Her paper, The Ancient Constitution vs. the
Federalist Empire, is superficially among the least property-focused of Carol’s writings,
but really she is engaging the issue in political theory that underlays the republicanrevival literature, in property scholarship as elsewhere: is American constitutional democracy better understood, descriptively and normatively, as the extensive commercial republic of formally equal rights-bearers, or with reference to the anti-federalist
or ancient-constitutional values of local self-rule, virtue, and the particularization of
certain rights and responsibilities?20 Not surprisingly, Carol will accept no moralistic
slurs against the commercial republic: she concludes that, if it is Babylon rather than
noble Sparta, “there are many people who really like Babylon, who prefer its coarseness to noble character, who revel in its remarkable energy, and find charm in the very
vulgarity of its dynamism.”21 Indeed. But Carol also insists that, if we look closely
at our actual practices, we will find that Babylon and Sparta are interwoven, and that
the spirits of localism and voluntary effort enrich the tapestry on which the drama of
commercial individualism takes place,22 while that drama gives local and voluntary
life a zest that Sparta lacked—“Spartan,” after all, is euphemism for “drab.” So again
we’re back to the inseparable and mutually supporting relationship between two
classes of values that are sometimes styled as implacably opposed.
Carol gives a kind of summa of this view in a William and Mary Law Review
piece that, typically, takes the posture not of high theory, but of a character sketch—
the character of “the moral subject of property,” the kind of person that property law
implicitly supposes its participants to be.23 Property’s moral subject is neither a utopian perfectionist, motivated mainly by visions of justice and fairness, nor the polemicist’s caricature of homo economicus, someone who is merely selfish.24 Instead, she
is a practitioner of Alexis de Tocqueville’s “self-interest rightly understood,” who
looks out for herself and her own, chiefly but not exclusively; who can be moved by
higher ideals, but not to the point of letting her feet get off the ground; and who prefers
to contribute to the common good when she knows everyone else will do the same,
so that she is not nagged by the fear of being everyone else’s sucker.25 Carol shows
19

See KARL MARX, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1888), reprinted in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 473, 476 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d. ed. 1978).
20
Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism
from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74 (1989).
21
Id. at 105.
22
Id.
23
See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897
(2007) [hereinafter Rose, Moral Subject].
24
Id. at 1898–99; see also PURDY, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing homo economicus).
25
See Rose, Moral Subject, supra note 23, at 1901–03 (citing Tocqueville and explaining
why a property owner would “give ground”).
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that the major moral objections to classic property are all tempered by the insight that
property law is based in compromises with this kind of human nature—and that this
is not a bad kind of nature, really, that it has marked redeeming virtues and is, in any
case and most of the time, who we are. In its low-built decency and its capacity to
trust and give, it even has, in Carol’s phrase, a streak of divinity.26 I like that. I had
thought when I remembered the phrase that it must be a “spark” of divinity, a more
conventional image, suggesting something that could start a wildfire. A streak can’t
set anything aflame—but it is a part of the larger composition, a line without which
the whole painting would be something else altogether.
What would the moral subject of property say to someone who wanted to stick
to one side or the other of a stylized opposition between economic evaluation and
other kinds of values? I picture Carol reenacting Samuel Johnson’s famous refutation
of skepticism, except that, instead of kicking a stone, she would clap her two hands
together, point to her own irresistibly grinning face, and say, “Thus I refute you.”27
***
A thought in concluding: As her student and sometime colleague, I know in
Carol’s way of being a teacher, collaborator, or friend, there is nothing to suggest that
the world is poor in time, resources, or rhetorical imagination. If I am right about her
work, then she may be caught in a performative contradiction—the kind of quasiKantian argument that she would hate, which is why I might make it—in which her
actions are inconsistent with her premises and therefore undercut her premises. There
must be no problem of scarce resources, or Carol wouldn’t be so generous! There must
be no rhetorical shortage, or she couldn’t be so funny! And that would be a chance
for her to invoke her most impudent line ever, answering her own question, “What do
I say to Immanuel Kant’s moral imperative? Hey, take gas, Manny, baby.”28
Anyway, I think the paradox is not Carol’s, but mine, and is built into the task of
trying to capture Carol within the four corners of any description, even one built on
complexity. So, as sometimes happens, I am driven back to my first instinct. Because, as I said, it is characteristic of the intellectual animal that is not a hedgehog that
you are never sure where to find it, and that if you do spot it somewhere, you can
expect not to see it there the next time you go looking for it, but be surprised by it in
some other place. The more confidently you believe you have pinned it down, the
more acute your surprise will be.
And so I conclude with my first thought about Carol. Whatever she says, she is
a fox. Don’t believe her if she denies it. That is exactly what a fox would do.
26

See id. at 1926 (“[The moral subject of property] has her own streak of divinity.”).
The precise quotation from Samuel Johnson, addressed to skepticism, is “I refute it
thus.” 1 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 397 (Dublin, John Chambers 1792).
28
Rose, Environmental Faust, supra note 2, at 1642.
27

THE BACKWARDS GESTURE: HISTORICAL NARRATIVES IN
CAROL ROSE’S PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP

Daniel J. Sharfstein*

I was a student in Carol Rose’s property course twelve years ago, and she was the
first law professor whose scholarship I sought out and read. Going into my 1L spring
semester, if I had to guess how I would spend my precious free time, I would not have
imagined myself poring over Crystals and Mud in Property Law1 and The Comedy of
the Commons.2 I had not gone to law school to become an academic—I kept telling
myself that I was set on being a prosecutor. But there was something about Carol’s
class and her scholarship that put me on a different path.
Right before law school, when I was a cub reporter for a small daily paper in
Southern California, I was told by a more experienced hand that every piece I would
ever write—about crime, local politics, the weather, the Rose Parade, even a gathering
of basset hound fanciers—was really about land use and property values. Whatever
I published, it would be understood and retold by my readers as a story about their
communities and about themselves. And deep down, that meant their investment in
Craftsman bungalows, Meyer lemon and avocado trees, and patches of grass watered
with laundry runoff. I thought I had left that sunny world behind when I moved to
New Haven. Carol Rose pulled me back in.
So what was it about Carol’s approach to property that inspired me to cast aside
my plans for a life of gainful employment and community service? Her work on the
primacy of storytelling and narrative in property law leaps out as the main suspect.
While property as a field of study is classically the province of economic thinking
about resource allocation and individual preferences, Carol has by her own admission
made it her scholarly project to show the enduring importance of narratives in understanding property.3 No one, it seems, can escape the spell of a good story. From
Hobbes and Locke to the present, the architects of classical property theory as well as
some of the most compelling modern economic scholars have resorted to narrative
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I am grateful to Eric
Kades for inviting me to the conference and to Mark Brandon and Kevin Stack for their
comments.
1
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)
[hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud].
2
Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy].
3
Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel,
18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Property and Language].
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to explain the development of property regimes.4 It is Carol’s insight that they need
narrative because classical explanations of human nature cannot account for the origins
of property. Without the persuasive power of stories to induce people to act contrary
to narrow self-interest, rational actors will not be able to form property regimes, or in
Carol’s words, “to create a community in which cooperation is possible.”5 Even as
they foster utility maximizing, the regimes themselves are cooperative and require
something different from participants. As much as property theory depends on predictive models of human behavior, it is rooted in something messier and more immanent.
Carol’s work keeps our focus on the role in property law of unpredictable narratives
and ultimately the push and pull of everyday experience.
Now, Carol certainly conveyed some of this in class, and I know I read and
liberally highlighted in pink an excerpt of Property as Storytelling6 in the reader that
supplemented our casebook. But as fascinating as I found Carol’s discussions of the
modes of storytelling that persist in property theory, I was equally enthralled with her
own way with a story. It was front and center in class, and it manifests itself in significant, but subtle ways in her scholarship. In her writing, the discussions of doctrine
and theory are unfailingly elegant, startling in their range and clarity. Her ideas can
be polished to a sheen—even when she talks about mud, her insights are crystals, compelling the reader to reach out, grasp them, and study the angles and refractions of light.
At the same time, Carol has an individual voice that every now and then leaps out from
the law review pages, creating a momentary diversion from the proceedings at hand,
but also demanding our attention alongside the ideas.7 Carol’s voice has a way of
making scene-stealing appearances, and far from detracting from her argument, it calls
attention to the fact that Carol, too, is constructing a story. It is a way of showing the
artisanal quality of her work—no one else could construct these ideas.
What do I mean by this? Well, in Property as Storytelling, when she describes several alternatives to the rational utility maximizer as the default model for predicting behavior, she first puts them under a heading that sounds like the title of a Victorian novel
I would like to read: “The Humdrum and the Weird; or, Predictable and Unpredictable
Preferences.”8 Then she assigns a name to each type of alternative. “The perfectly
4

See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329, 333 (1996) (discussing Locke’s narrative of the social compact theory for understanding
the foundation of property rights).
5
Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 38–39 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Property
as Storytelling].
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 267, 272–73 (1994) (following a discussion of a “bleak account” of the “interrelations between property and vision” as “antiquated
false consciousness” with the line, “Now, wait a minute”).
8
Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 5, at 43.
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ordinary person” is “John Doe.”9 Fair enough. A more competitive person is “King
of the Mountain.”10 A reflexive bad actor is “Malice Aforethought.”11 The altruistic
person is, simply and charmingly, “Mom.”12 She is not to be confused with a more
compulsively self-sacrificing, but still rational actor: “Portnoy’s Mom.”13 And finally,
there’s the out-and-out masochist who goes by the name “Hit Me.”14 Carol says she
names the types so they are more easily remembered, but I find it hard to get past the
labels. Whenever I think about the article, I chuckle about “Portnoy’s Mom.” Rather
than functioning as a mnemonic, the labels call attention to their creator, who is not
simply giving us an argument, but is also letting us know, in an article about storytelling, that she has a story to tell.
What stories does Carol Rose tell? Very occasionally, they seem to reveal something about her personal sensibility. One gets the impression, for instance, that Phillip
Roth’s oeuvre coexists on her shelves with novels by George Eliot and, if I had to
guess, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and Charles Dickens.15 She’s watched an episode or two, perhaps more, of NYPD Blue.16 She is no stranger to country music.17
But the stories that have engaged me the most are the stories Carol tells about the
historical past, and that is what I will focus on for the rest of this essay. Her interest
in history as a lens for understanding property law is in keeping with a tradition at
least as old as Locke and Blackstone.18 When Carol Rose talks about narrative filling
in the gaps of property theory, she often means historical narrative. When she describes
the “moral community” that the storyteller creates “by structuring the audience’s experience and imagination,”19 the verb tense that Carol uses is significant: “[The teller of
tales] tells us, ‘Here is what we (or they) did, and how we (or they) did it.’”20
Carol’s histories are hard to classify. Although her sources are mainly the stuff
of intellectual, political, and more purely doctrinal legal history, she infuses them with
social and cultural context.21 Her work spans time and space, engaging with ideas and
9

Id.
Id. at 44.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 45.
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., id.; Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 3, at 2 (making the unlikely
comparison between herself and Casaubon).
16
Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1681, 1682 (2007).
17
Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1897,
1900 (2007) (theorizing the morality of property in terms of a Patty Loveless song).
18
Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 5, at 38.
19
Id. at 55.
20
Id. (emphasis added).
21
Michael Heller has elegantly described Carol’s sense of history and social context as a
vision of how “law accumulates through layers of sediment and sentiment.” Michael Heller,
The Rose Theorem, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 29, 30 (2006) (emphasis in original).
10
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incidents from ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the European Enlightenment—which she studied in an earlier incarnation as an academic historian—and the
American Republic. Many of her articles begin with a present-day impasse or an established piece of conventional wisdom involving some area of property law.22 Carol
then delves into history as a way of denaturalizing the consensus position, only to
resurface in the present with a new perspective. It is not exactly the kind of history
she was trained to write when she was authoring articles with titles like The Issue
of Parliamentary Suffrage at the Frankfurt National Assembly, 1848–1849.23 But
Carol’s approach elevates history to a position of central importance. “Ordinary practice is part of a tradition and cannot be entirely reinvented,” she wrote in an early
article.24 “But if some of our views about property are dysfunctional remnants, historical inquiry will help to identify them, and it will also highlight those traditional
property concepts that are still valid for us.”25
The backwards gesture as a means of going forward: It sounds like a basketball
move—could be what got Carol elected to the George Mason High School Athletic
Hall of Fame—but it’s also a critical move, even as Carol holds a decidedly less
bleak view of property as an institution than scholars flying the Critical Legal Studies
flag. Carol has been structuring her arguments in this way since she was an acting
professor at Boalt Hall in 1981 writing about New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation.26 Recognizing the vogue for historic preservation, Carol notes a confounding problem: what makes something “historic” and what counts as “preservation”
are, in her words, “so elastic that any sort of project can be justified—or any change
vilified—in its name.”27 How does she find a principled solid ground? By looking at
the history of historic preservation. This is cultural and intellectual history, but it is
rooted in the very real social consequences of historic preservation and urban renewal.
Carol proposes a set of processes designed to encourage individuals to talk about and
debate the future of their neighborhoods. Even as she discusses the emergence of ideas
about what old buildings are meant to inspire in us, she pairs the ideas with a more
immanent notion of community, neighbor to neighbor and street by street.28
22

See, e.g., Rose, Comedy, supra note 2, at 711–12; Carol Rose, Romans, Roads,
and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003).
23
See Rose, Property and Language, supra note 3, at 3 n.3. The move from present to
past to present more closely mirrors how readers today comprehend long-ago events, and it
parallels the ex-post perspectives of judges, who are constantly trying to bring the past into the
present. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 603.
24
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 599 (1984) [hereinafter Rose, Mahon Reconstructed].
25
Id.
26
Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981).
27
Id. at 476.
28
Id. at 481–91, 534.
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Within a few years Carol was writing classic works of property theory, but her
basic approach remained the same. Possession as the Origin of Property answers the
fundamental question of property, “How do things come to be owned?”, first by historicizing the question with views from intellectual history—Locke, Grotius, Puffendorf,
and Blackstone—and then quickly moving to a trio of nineteenth-century cases.29
Theory and doctrine lead to an insight grounded in everyday life, the idea of “possession as some kind of statement.”30 While Carol uses the language of literary criticism,
what matters most is that a statement is a social act. Acts of possession may be “texts,”
but they are “texts . . . of cultivation, manufacture, and development.”31 It is what
people think, to use an example from the essay, when they see fenced-in land where
cows are grazing.32 Although the piece concludes by suggesting that rules of possession embody and structure a relationship between people and nature,33 these rules
just as significantly shape and represent how people relate to each other. Possession
requires communication to an audience, and the audience’s response determines the
validity of the communication.
Carol’s next article, The Comedy of the Commons, burrows beneath the conventional wisdom regarding the right to exclude and the tragedy of the commons by exploring “historic doctrines about ‘inherently public’ property [that] vested property
rights in the ‘unorganized public’ rather than in a governmentally-organized public.”34
Masterfully interpreting old doctrines dealing with roads, waterways, and sites for
traditional recreational activities, Carol connects the legal principles of public property with the social content of property law.35 She suggests that, despite words to the
contrary in American decisions, these types of uses all engage with custom, the “social
glue” that allows “indefinite and informal” groups to manage themselves, fosters the
“educative and socializing” effects of commerce, and nurtures emotional attachments
to particular types of uses in particular places.36 Using history to emphasize the individual relationships and pastimes that property fosters, the article, in effect, dances a
maypole dance around the consensus position about public and private rights.
Carol returns repeatedly to the economic story of scarcity, self-interest and exclusion, and while she finds compelling insights in the utilitarian justifications for
property, her work complicates those narratives by juxtaposing past and present, high
29

Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73–77,
85 (1985).
30
Id. at 77 (emphasis in original).
31
Id. at 82, 84–85, 88.
32
Id. at 77–78.
33
Id. at 87.
34
Rose, Comedy, supra note 2, at 720–21.
35
Id. at 722–23, 740–41.
36
Id. at 742, 759, 775, 779. In an informal aside, Carol Rose makes her point with a rhetorical question that has since attained a tragic resonance, at least in certain parts of Michigan:
“To Detroit residents, does it matter that the Tigers play in Tiger Stadium?” Id. at 759.
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theory and the nitty gritty of everyday experience. I’ll talk about two more of my
favorite pieces before concluding. Crystals and Mud in Property Law questions the
notion that scarcity begets hard-edged property entitlements through examples in the
law concerning caveat emptor, mortgages, and land registration.37 These examples
draw from what her colleague Robert Gordon would call “mandarin” legal materials,38
citing to a lot of old appellate decisions.39 Yet when Carol moves on to explain the
cycles of hard-edged crystalline rules and muddier standards, what matters most are
the individual characters who walk through the decisions, the “ninnies, hard-luck cases,
and the occasional scoundrels who take advantage of them.”40 The piece becomes a
story of people who are “snookered” and people who do the snookering, how they
overload a property regime that is in essence a commons, and how crystal rules and
mud rules embody “different modes of conversation and interaction” when people
engage with each other as strangers or neighbors.41 It is social history wrapped in
mandarin robes.
And in Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, an essay I greatly admired as a second-year grunt on a law journal edit team, Carol decenters the right to
exclude by placing Blackstone’s chestnut about “sole and despotic dominion” beside
other, more ambiguous statements in the Commentaries about property rights.42 Carol
uses Blackstone’s statements—an expression of anxiety that there may be “some defect
in our title”43 and in the existing distribution of entitlements; a utilitarian justification
for property rights; and a lengthy, neutral, positivist description of property doctrine—
to draw an intellectual genealogy for three modern takes on property; Critical Legal
Studies, law and economics, and doctrinal accounts.44 In rooting all three modes of
scholarship in the same historical source, in understanding how Blackstone could contain these multitudes along with his statement of the primacy of exclusion, Carol again
moves from intellectual history to an account of property’s social role. Property is a
legal regime that continually balances individual rights, rights shared by neighbors,
and community claims. It is the “most profoundly sociable of human institutions,”
keeping people apart but also bringing them together.45
By way of conclusion, I want to discuss Carol’s historical approach to regulatory takings and racially restrictive covenants, issues that occupy the hazy boundary
between property and constitutional law. Digging through the past to shed light on
37

Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 580–90.
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 120 (1984).
39
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 580–88.
40
Id. at 587.
41
Id. at 587, 610.
42
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601,
601 (1998).
43
Id. at 604.
44
Id. at 605–06.
45
Id. at 632.
38
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the present is common in constitutional law.46 But Carol’s histories are not fixated
on original meaning, with the Framers and the text that they produced as alpha and
omega. Her work situates these constitutional issues within property’s larger intellectual and social traditions.
When she first encountered the “takings muddle” in 1984, she retreated to the
apparent source of the confusion, Holmes and Brandeis’s opinions in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,47 only to move even further back to ideas about property in the
early Republic.48 Like a good constitutional law scholar, she cites Madison and
Jefferson, refers to “Antifederalists,” and checks in with Tocqueville.49 But she embeds
Madison within the classical utilitarian/economic vision of property—tellingly referring
to his position as the “Lockean/Madisonian/Benthamite argument for acquisition”—
while Jefferson is paired with Aristotelian ideas of civic virtue.50
In Carol’s compelling view, the muddle in regulatory takings law reflects the
persistence of dual—and at times dueling—conceptions of property.51 Our property
regime has multiple missions, and sometimes there are no pat solutions. Revisiting
the issue fifteen years later, Carol framed the regulatory takings debate within the larger
context of expropriations in the American experience, suggesting a “historic pattern
of takings compromises” inherent to property law’s complex balance of collective and
individual interests.52 The muddle reflects a tradition, and a grand one at that.
Finally, in a rich narrative about Shelley v. Kraemer,53 Carol confronts the major
constitutional issue—whether judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment—by focusing on how racially
restrictive covenants would fare under various property doctrines.54 The retreat into
common law rules about restrictions on alienation, perpetuities, horizontal privity,
touch and concern, and changed circumstances55 yields a fascinating suggestion:
judicial enforcement becomes state actions by giving legal force to a set of implicit
46

See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING

OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
47

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 24.
49
Id. at 588–92.
50
Id. at 590–91, 593. These are issues Carol Rose returned to in The Ancient Constitution
vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern
Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 85–87 (1989), and in her work on traditions of property as
“propriety” in “Takings” and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as
“Propriety,” in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note 7, at 49.
51
See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 24, at 566–69.
52
Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22, 38.
53
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
54
See Carol M. Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 189–90,
197–204 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
55
Id. at 197–204, 208.
48
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assumptions about race and property values that landowners in St. Louis might have
made in the 1940s and thereby enforcing customs otherwise unrecognized by property
law.56 Describing state action as “intimately connected to the law of property,”57 the
essay makes the narrow question of state action secondary to the social effects of
property law. It can, Carol writes, “exclude, insult and grievously injure those who
are considered outsiders,” but at the same time it allows people into the regime on a
neutral basis and fosters their participation on terms of equality.58 In reflecting “the
best instincts in property law,” Shelley becomes more coherent as constitutional law.59
And the Constitution emerges not as a catalog of categorical rights, but as one text
among many that gives meaning to the daily give-and-take of life in a community.

56
57
58
59

Id. at 215–18.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 218, 220.

ROSE’S HUMAN NATURE OF PROPERTY
Henry E. Smith*

Many social theories claim to have the human being at their center. That has been
more a matter of theory than practice in many of those theories. But in the case of
Carol Rose’s scholarship on property it could not be more true. In many of her works,
Carol develops sophisticated theories about property by focusing in on characters.
While they are sometimes humorous and colorful, the characters capture something
important about human nature, and Carol, like an older tradition that we could learn
a lot from, explores property through the lens of human nature. In it she finds many
twists and turns. I will focus on how the characters of the ninny and the scoundrel call
for crystals and mud1—bright line rules and vague standards, yes, but quite a bit more
than that. In Carol’s view a variety of the tragedy of the commons with crystals and
mud leads to endless cycling between crystals and mud.2 At the end I will argue that
human nature may also lead to a sort of equilibrium in the law, an equilibrium we could
associate with the traditions of law versus equity. But for that to occur we do need
some significant degree of moral consensus, upon which we can ground our equitable
interventions. This need for moral consensus takes us back to Carol’s insights about
human nature and to her humanistic bourgeois view of property based on narrative.
Carol points out that famous accounts of property from Locke and Blackstone to
Demsetz all involve a view—or views—of human nature.3 All of them ground a
picture of property in self-interest, possible enlightened self-interest, but then import
covertly a more cooperative or even altruistic aspect of people when it comes time to
set up the property system.4 A system of private property requires collective action,
and a world of narrowly rational utility maximizers—a character Carol once called
“RUM” with, I think, the British meaning of “odd” in mind5—would have a difficult
time getting the system off the ground.
* Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78, 587
(1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud] (describing the “characters” who muck up
bright line rules to include “ninnies, hard-luck cases, and the occasional scoundrels who take
advantage of them”).
2
Id. at 595–604.
3
Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 38–39 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Property
as Storytelling].
4
Id. at 38–40.
5
Carol M. Rose, “Enough, and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 417–22
(1987) (introducing the fictional character “Rational Utility Maximizer,” or “RUM”).
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At the same time, almost uniquely among property theorists, Carol is open to
elements of the doux commerce theory: that commerce is a sociable institution and
can be expected to cultivate virtues (in addition to the now more familiar vices).6 Indeed, Carol notes that gifts and commercial exchanges partake of each other and are
not so easy to separate.7 Overall, Carol is one of the few theorists these days to see
how humane and lovely the mundane and the bourgeois can be.
These elements feature prominently in Carol’s work on crystals and mud, which
I’d like to focus on here. In drawing this distinction, Carol has made a characteristically deep insight into the nature of the legal system. Crystals and mud roughly—but
only roughly—track rules versus standards, but potentially imply much more. The law
may start out with a crisp rule that gives a clear and sharp boundary between states of
the world—is there a contract or isn’t there, was there a trespass or wasn’t there? But
because the results don’t always look pretty, there is a temptation—and especially for
judges who see matters in all their particularity after they have gone wrong—to start
tinkering.8 This takes the formless form of muddying things up, of making exceptions
and second-guessing.9 If this happens enough, some actor—a legislator or contracting
party—may crisp things up into crystal again and start the process over.10
Later I would like to return to the oscillation that Carol sees as inherent in crystals
and mud and offer an alternative that may sometimes occur, but first, notice how far
the notion of crystals and mud by itself gets us. The literature is certainly filled with
related theories about rules versus standards,11 bright lines and vagueness,12 analyzed
6

Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 607 (noting that enlightment thinkers hoped
“commerce would enlarge sociability”); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and
Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44
FLA. L. REV. 295, 302 (1992) [hereinafter Rose, Giving] (arguing that gifts play an important
role in commerce); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 775–81 (1986); see also ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM
BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 56–63 (1977) (explaining historical background of the “douceur of
commerce”).
7
Rose, Giving, supra note 6, at 296.
8
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 604.
9
Id. at 578.
10
Id. at 597–601.
11
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 6–8 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992); Amnon Lehavi,
The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J.
(forthcoming 2011); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 56–69 (1992).
12
See, e.g., TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000); John E. Calfee &
Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA.
L. REV. 965 (1984); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design:
The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Michael F. Ferguson &
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through economic and philosophical lenses among others. Rules are more expensive
to formulate but cheaper to apply.13 Rules give certainty and standards are vague and
uncertain. Some, especially those associated with critical legal studies, see rules as
reflecting individualism and domination and standards as embodying community and
altruism.14 All these theories are fairly abstract and try to see rules versus standards
in their most general light.
But Carol approaches crystals and mud in a bottom-up way, through a set of characters and their stories. Yes, much of the time people handle rules just fine and we
have reasonable, rational people going about their business without too many worries.
But what happens to the hapless—or to use Carol’s terms, the ninnies or mopes15—
who are improvident or foolish, and make mistakes? We could just let them bear the
consequences of their folly and relentlessly apply crystalline rules. A lesson will be
learned. But there is a big problem. The ninnies can be prey to the scoundrels and
sharp dealers who are looking for ninnies to exploit.16 Fearing being duped, some will
avoid transacting or take excessive precaution.17
Carol sees this dynamic and the pound of flesh it results in as the beginning of a
dynamic of oscillation.18 Thus, in the demise of caveat emptor, in mortgage law, and
the recording acts, Carol sees an endless cycle of crystals and mud.19 Legislatures and
parties put in crystalline rules and in some sense overuse them—put them under too
much strain—because courts do not like punishing the hapless or letting the scoundrels
get away with sharp dealing.20
Let me offer another possibility about some of the phenomena that Carol groups
under crystals and mud, to which we can add a lot more similar phenomena beyond
property. Some of the examples of crystals and mud, and in particular the ones involving mortgages and to some extent recording, are the result of the interventions by
equity courts or by courts acting in an equity mode. I suggest that this is no accident
and no artifact of ancient procedure either. Rather, I argue elsewhere that going all the
way back to Aristotle and carried forward by the early modern thinkers from whom
Carol draws some of her inspiration, equity in the private law has a major theme:
Stephen R. Peters, But I Know it When I See it: An Economic Analysis of Vague Rules (Jan.
2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=218968.
13
Kaplow, supra note 11, at 568–86.
14
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685, 1773–74 (1976); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15, 38, 54–55 (1987) (explaining the “competing political paradigms” of individuals
and altruism).
15
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 587, 599–600 (explaining “ninnies” and “mopes”
as “hard luck cases,” the latter being a Chicago term for the victims of petty con artists).
16
Id. at 587, 600.
17
Id. at 599.
18
Id. at 596.
19
Id. at 580–90, 596–97.
20
Id. at 601–04.
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preventing opportunism.21 That is a tall order, and the rap on equity was always that
it was arbitrary and destabilizing—of being measured by the “Chancellor’s foot.”22
And the common law lawyers never ceased to bring out the dark side of equity. Although equity “won” the battle with the common law, it professed modesty: it was
meant only as a safety valve for the law on account of the law’s inadequacy—particularly in the face of opportunism.23 And by “opportunism,” I mean the use of the system
in hard-to-foresee ways by better informed parties even at the expense of shrinking
total surplus.24 Like theft and fraud, opportunism would be contracted away if contracting were costless, which of course it is not. The civilians seem to have something like
this in mind when they speak of “abuse of right.”25
To serve as a safety valve against opportunism, equity is a holistic mode of decision
making that is not fully captured by rules versus standards.26 First of all, equity was
21

Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 17–18 (Oct. 22, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
22
See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 46
(Edward Arber ed., 1869) (1689) (“Equity is a Roguish thing, for Law we have a measure,
know what to trust to, Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and
as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the Standard
for the measure we call a Chancellor’s foot, what an uncertain measure would this be? One
Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third an indifferent Foot. ‘Tis the same
thing in the Chancellors Conscience.”).
23
Smith, supra note 21, at 3, 19.
24
For discussions of opportunism in economics, see, for example, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985) (defining “opportunism” as “selfinterest seeking with guile”); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage Opportunism,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (1994) (defining “opportunistic behavior” in the marital context
as “undertaking activities inconsistent with the marital agreement”); Timothy J. Muris,
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 522 (1981)
(discussing “how certain legal principles . . . can be low-cost methods of deterring opportunistic behavior”); Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 97, 105 (1993) (discussing the role of opportunism in economic analysis).
25
See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J.
37 (1995) (arguing that a concept of abuse of rights is implicit in the common law); Anna di
Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
687, 689–90 (2010) (“Abuse of rights was a most typical ‘invention’ of the wave of social
legal thought that developed . . . in the mid-nineteenth century [and] called for a sociological
and organicistic mode of reasoning that took into account the purpose of legal rules and the
complexity of ‘social mechanics.’”); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right:
Something Old, Something New . . ., 54 LA. L. REV. 1173, 1192–93 (1994) (noting similarities and differences between abuse of right and equity); Larissa M. Katz, A Jurisdictional
Principle of Abuse of Right 4 (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1417955 (arguing that abuse of right is consistent with common law idea of ownership);
Lehavi, supra note 11, at 69–71 (explaining “abuse of rights” occurs when a party with property
rights exercises them in a way that “may turn the legitimate use into legally prohibited abuse”).
26
Smith, supra note 21, at 38–40.
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only supposed to be an exception. Unlike property, it was in personam—it operated
on the person and did not announce general rules—and concomitantly it was supposed
to tread carefully when property rights were involved.27 But because, as Justice Story
once said, “[f]raud is infinite” given the “fertility of man’s invention,”28 equity too
needed to be open-ended, with ex post discretion and an irreducible vagueness. As
is familiar in tax law, if you announce a bright line rule, the evasionary behavior
begins immediately.29 Closing nine out of ten loopholes does not do the trick either,
because the sophisticated will rush through the tenth one. And not coincidentally, tax
law has a stable of equity-like doctrines like substance over form, sham transaction,
and step transaction, that aim to deter opportunists.30 Finally, in view of its targeting
opportunism and its origins with a clerical official—the Chancellor—equity is based
on common sense morality and emphasizes good faith and intent.
What does this have to do with crystals and mud? The problem for equity has
always been how to cabin it—how to ensure that it was a safety valve and did not take
over all the time. This presents a particular problem today in our post-fusion, postLegal Realist era, and I will return to this inherent expansionary quality of equity.
Carol sees these limits as ultimately futile: crystals and mud will always alternate in
an endless cycle.31 It is like a crude thermostat: it is too cool so we raise the thermostat,
27

See, e.g., Charles M. Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 192, 202–06 (1976) (illustrating how courts of equity were prohibited from
addressing real estate disputes); Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate
Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L.
REV. 175, 177 (2003) (listing nine equitable principles used by the South Carolina courts,
including “[e]quity follows the law” and “[e]quity acts in personam, not in rem”).
28
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 200 n.4 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886) (1839) (quoting
Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaimes (June 30, 1759)). Or, as Chancellor Ellesmere
put the point: “The Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and
infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances.” Earl of Oxford’s Case, (1615) 21 Eng. Rep.
485, 486 (Ch.); see also Robert Lowry Clinton, Classical Legal Naturalism and the Politics
of John Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 935, 948 (2000)
(discussing Carl Dibble’s identification of a “moderate Enlightenment” tradition of legal interpretation associated with Grotius, Blackstone, and Marshall, which emphasized the role of
equity and located the need for interpreting laws not in the ambiguity of language but in the
possibility “that corrupt, duplicitous persons will ‘treat the law in a sophisticated manner’ in
order to advance their own individual interests” (quoting Carl M. Dibble, The Lost Tradition
of Modern Legal Interpretation 5 (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (essay prepared for delivery
at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association))).
29
David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1990).
30
See id. at 861; see also Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code:
The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969)
(arguing that broad anti-avoidance standards allow for reduction in the complexity of tax law).
31
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 582–83, 585, 588–89, 596–97.
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but then we notice that it is too hot and we put the thermostat way down again, which
is too cold for our liking, and so on.
But I think another dynamic can happen and at various times did happen with law
and equity. We could call it sedimentation. Take the equitable principle that one may
not profit from one’s own wrong. The classic here is Riggs v. Palmer,32 which interestingly formed the springboard for Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of the jurisprudence
of principles.33 There the court held that a grandson could not share in his grandfather’s
estate after he killed the grandfather to prevent him from changing his will.34 That
would be to profit from his own wrong.35 The court used equity both to interpret the
wills statute and as a directly applicable general principle: “No one shall be permitted
to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim
upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.”36 These days states
tend to have “slayer” statutes that take care of this situation.37 Yes, there can be borderline cases, but the Riggs problem is now a familiar one and not an unanticipated defect
in the wills statute that an opportunist (and worse) might take advantage of. The mud
of equity has at least partly sedimented, not because the legislature did not like muddiness, but because once the problem became known it was not that hard to solve. Does
this mean that equity is out of business? Not at all, because the scoundrels are ever
with us, looking for the interstices in our ever changing legal landscape. Equity needs
to be constantly vigilant for new opportunism, and so it can be thought of as a moving
frontier leaving sediment or even crystals in its wake. So here crystals come from mud
and there is a long-term equilibrium that involves them both. But they do not exactly
oscillate here.
One of Carol’s examples, recording acts, may partake of this sedimentation process. The early race statutes—whoever won the race to the recoding office won a title
contest even if the winner knew of an earlier unrecorded deed—were unstable for all
the reasons Carol mentions.38 But once the courts read in a notice requirement in to
take care of the opportunists, legislatures were happy to go along.39 This sedimented
equity has had incredible staying power. Although there are controversies around the
edges and things can still go wrong, the broad outlines—roughly half the states with

32

22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–45 (1977).
34
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 188–90.
35
Id. at 190.
36
Id.
37
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 149–51 (8th ed. 2009).
38
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 587–88 (noting that sympathies for the “luckless unrecorded owner” and distrust of the “nasty second buyer” led to “the muddying” of the
recording system).
39
14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[1][c][iii] (Michael Allan
Wolf, ed., 2000).
33
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notice statutes and half with race-notice statutes, and almost none with race statutes—
seem to be a relatively stable equilibrium.40
What seems to be necessary for the oscillation between crystals and mud is for
courts, and here I mean equity courts, to overshoot. This has happened, but it is hard
to tell exactly when. The currently important topic of mortgage foreclosures is illustrative. Aside from the question of whether the cycling here is regular or more like
punctuated equilibrium,41 the response of private parties like lenders is ambiguous in
the absence of a lot of contextual information. When it comes to forfeitures, if it is private parties trying to get around the procedural protections associated with mortgages,
why isn’t that sometimes just the opportunists finding new avenues of opportunism
and evading the substance of the law?
One way that we might distinguish oscillation from sedimentation is in terms of
the directness of the role of equity courts. What I have in mind is a limited intervention
to stop opportunists. To do this, we need good proxies for opportunism. One such is
disproportionate hardship, which Carol very insightfully notes can be the result of sharp
dealing.42 She makes reference as well to the long tradition of policing bargains for
gross inequality (not mere inequality).43
But I would say that disproportionate hardship is a theme all over equity, and it is
very effective in picking out opportunism.44 It is not as much a sign of sympathy with
the hapless, although it can be that too, but a red flag raising the specter of opportunism.
Thus, disproportionate hardship turns out to be important not just in forfeitures, as
Carol notes, but also in other areas.45 We don’t like forcing a good-faith building
encroacher to tear down a barely encroaching structure at great cost.46 We don’t like
40

Id. § 82.02[1][c][ii]. On some of the problems, see, for example, D. BARLOW BURKE,
JR., AMERICAN CONVEYANCING PATTERNS: PAST IMPROVEMENTS AND CURRENT DEBATES
103–04, 120 n.2 (William N. Kinnard, Jr. ed., 1978); Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record
Search and Therefore of Notice: Part 1, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 125–26 (1944).
41
For a variety of views on whether and in what sense change occurs in the area of mortgages, see, e.g., A. H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REV.
1061 (1933) (discussing devices implemented to save credit systems during down-cycles);
Robert H. Skilton, Developments in Mortgage Law and Practice, 17 TEMP. U. L.Q. 315,
318–20, 321–31 (1943) (discussing various types of foreclosures); Sheldon Tefft, The Myth
of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 577–81, 588–90, 595 (1937) (comparing English
reform in foreclosures with American law of mortgages).
42
Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 587–88, 598–99.
43
Id. at 598 (citing James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981)).
44
Smith, supra note 21, at 15–16, 33–34, 37, 48–49.
45
See Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 1, at 597–601.
46
See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding California’s
good faith improver legislation); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951)
(“Where defendant’s encroachment is unintentional and slight, plaintiff’s use not affected and
his damage small and fairly compensable, while the cost of removal is so great as to cause
grave hardship or otherwise make its removal unconscionable, mandatory injunction may
properly be denied and plaintiff relegated to compensation in damages.”); Kelvin H. Dickinson,
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seeing one who has innocently labored on relatively cheap materials lose everything
to the owner of the stuff under the doctrine of accession.47 And we don’t like giving
injunctions where it secures a little benefit at the cost of gross harm or disproportionate
hardship on the one enjoined.48 Indeed, this is what “balancing the equities” for
injunctions is really about—not cost benefit tests, nor all-things-considered contextualized analysis.
The problem is that equity is quite controversial. Formalists would like to read
it out of our system and post-Realists like to see context available to decision making
everywhere.49 Indeed, we have an oscillation of a sort between of crystals and mud in
the eternal dispute between the Justice Scalias of the world and the Justice Ginsburgs
of the world, as was on display in the case of Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.
v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,50 involving asset freezing injunctions. Do we ask if this
particular type of equitable device was used in the late eighteenth century,51 or do we
celebrate the flexibility of injunctions and assume that recitation of the factors for an
injunction like inadequacy of the legal remedy will constrain their use?52 I would say
neither. Rather it is a crystal filled with mud. Equity is a highly structured safety valve
within which courts are highly flexible, and stringent, and not least moralistic. Equity
relies as it must on common sense morality—on a consensus about what is proper—
not fairness in a deeply theoretical sense or in great detail, but fairness and morality
in rough and widely acceptable outlines.
Do we have such a consensus? I am somewhat optimistic, but only somewhat.
For one thing, we have to stop teaching our students that legal materials are clay in
their hands. We, including judges, need a consensus on what is a rule and what is an
exception, what is a baseline and what is a departure from it, and, not least, what is a
Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42–49 (1985) (offering a survey of
various statutory and judicial relief for mistaken improvers across jurisdictions).
47
See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 313 (1871) (“The objections to allowing
the owner of the trees to reclaim the property under such circumstances are, that it visits the
involuntary wrong-doer too severely for his unintentional trespass, and at the same time compensates the owner beyond all reason for the injury he has sustained. . . . Where vicious motive
or reckless disregard of right are not involved, to inflict upon a person who has taken the property of another, a penalty equal to twenty or thirty times its value, and to compensate the owner
in a proportion equally enormous, is so opposed to all legal idea of justice and right and to the
rules which regulate the recovery of damages generally, that if permitted by the law at all, it
must stand out as an anomaly and must rest upon peculiar reasons.”).
48
Smith, supra note 21, at 37.
49
Id. at 3, 51.
50
527 U.S. 308 (1999).
51
Id. at 318–33 (holding that federal district courts lacked power to issue asset freezing
injunctions because they were historically unavailable from a court of equity and arguing that
unbounded equity would be arbitrary, and that Congress is the place to decide such a power
over creditors).
52
Id. at 333–42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting historical flexibility and generativity of
equity and arguing that the standards for issuing injunctions cabin power adequately).
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legitimate use of the system and what is not. Where does this consensus come from
in our highly contentious age? I think it has to come from a view of human nature
much like the one Carol offers in her work. A person who is rational but has human
foibles, and who wants to do the right thing: “that kind of girl,”53 Mom,54 or Good
Citizen George,55 for example. Someone who is bourgeois but has her sights on higher
things as well. Someone practical and sociable. For law and equity to coexist we
need a new-old narrative.

53

Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1897
(2007) (quoting PATTY LOVELESS, I’m That Kind of Girl, on ON DOWN THE LINE (MCA
Records 1990) (“I ain’t the woman in red, I ain’t the girl next door / But if somewhere in the
middle’s what you’re lookin’ for / I’m that kind of girl . . . .”)) (identifying the moral subject
of property with “that kind of girl”).
54
Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 3, at 44–45 (introducing Mom, or Good
Citizen, who is an altruist who wants herself and the other both to do well but then puts the
other first); id. at 55 (explaining that “Mom the cooperator takes risks for a common good”).
55
Id. at 52 (describing “Good Citizen George” as a character “who would be willing to
do some work for the sake of the common good,” much like the Mom character).

